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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the behavior of drivers when they face a safe-traffic
environment. Some studies suggest that the laws that demand auto makers to produce safer
vehicles also stimulate their drivers to drive carelessly, since the cost of driving carefully
decreases. Likewise, a safer traffic environment or less dangerous surroundings can stimulate
drivers to drive more aggressively and less carefully. This study tries to test whether the
undesirable behavior described by Peltzman (1975) is observed on the highways and roads of
the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Estimates based on data found in the Brazilian Federal
Road Police’s accident report databank confirm drivers’ lack of attention in safer
environments. The results suggest that careless behavior in traffic increases when safer
conditions prevail.
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In 2004, the World  Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Bank published a 
report on the prevention of traffic accidents.  The report estimates that 1.18 million people 
died in 2002 because of traffic accidents.  This figure represents 2.1% of all causes of deaths, 
and places traffic accidents in the 11
th position of this ranking. 
More than 50% of the accident victims are adults and youths aged between 15 and 44 
years.  In developing countries, the costs of traffic accidents represent something between 1% 
and 2% of GDP
1. 
The  existence  of  economic  costs  of  accidents  often  suggests  public  policies  that 
contribute to a safer traffic:  investments in a safer road infrastructure, the application of 
norms for producing safer vehicles, and traffic control and education.  However, what if the 
investment in road infra-structure also causes an increase in the drivers’ perception of safety, 
inducing them to drive imprudently?  For instance, a road with new pavement and signs, and 
safer vehicles (with safety items such as seat belts, air bags, lateral protection bars) can reduce 
the effort for a more cautious driving.  The objective of this article is to contribute to the 
understanding of the behaviour of drivers facing safer environments. 
In the cases in which such adverse effect of road conditions improvements on the 
drivers’ behaviour with regard to the trade-off speed/attention (prudence) cannot be refuted, 
investing in a change in the driver’s behaviour becomes a priority in order to reduce the 
number of accidents.  As a result, traffic control becomes a key element in increasing the 
costs of inattentive or careless driving. 
Some studies tested this adverse behaviour, but none of them has yet been carried out 
for Brazilian roads.  This paper uses the Polícia Rodoviária Federal (Federal Road Police) 
DATATRAN database from 2004 to 2006, in order to investigate whether drivers in safer 
environments present aggressive or careless behaviour.  In the following section, we perform 
a brief literature review.  Section 3 explains the methodology and data source used, and 
presents the results.  Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THE DRIVERS’ BEHAVIOUR 
 
The works that examine the determinants of drivers’ behaviour or of traffic accidents 
basically follow two references:  one of them is Becker (1969) and the other is Peltzman 
(1975).  As Loureiro, Sachsida and Moreira (2004) assert, if imprudence is understood as a 
result of an illegal behaviour of the driver, the framework proposed by Becker (1968) can be 
used.    The  illegal  behaviour  would  be  related  to the cost-benefit  analysis  carried out  by 
individuals in rational decision-making.  Loureiro, Sachsida and Moreira (2004) argue that an 
individual chooses to go beyond the speed limit, for example, because such action reduces 
transportation costs (less time on the route), but on the other hand observes an increase of the 
risks of facing costs for violating the law (traffic fines, loss of driver’s licence and even 
imprisonment).  The illegal behaviour therefore results from maximising utility, which could 
determine traffic accidents. 
                                            
1  Some  of  the  costs  of  traffic  accidents  are:  first  aid  for  victims,  hospital  expenditures,  social  security 
expenditures, vehicle damages, road damages, traffic jams, temporary or permanent production losses etc. The 
total estimated cost of traffic accidents in Brazil in 2005 was of approximately 6.5 billion Brazilian Reais (3.8 
billion Dollars using April´s 2008 average exchange rate) [IPEA/DENATRAN (2006)].  The state of Minas 
Gerais leads the ranking of the total estimate cost of accidents in federal roads.  This position can be explained 
by the extension of the federal road network in the state, which is the largest in Brazil, and by the great flow of 
vehicles.  The state also serves as a connection from the South to the Northeast of Brazil and to a significant part 




For the case of Brazil, with a theoretical basis on Becker (1968), Mendes (2002) tested 
the effectiveness of the new Traffic Code enacted in 1997 through an ARIMA model with 
intervention.  The author used the aggregate series of the rate of mortality per capita in traffic 
accidents in Brazil.  The results showed that the impact on the mortality decrease was only 
temporary  and  small  if  compared  to  similar  regulations  applied in  other  countries.   This 
supports the idea that drivers perform a cost-benefit analysis of careless driving, because the 
reduction in mortality occurred only in the first year of the implementation of the law, during 
which there were high punishment expectations.  After the first year in force, the inefficiency 
in  the  law’s  application  pointed  to  a  lower  cost  of  driving  aggressively  or  carelessly.  
Therefore, the reduction would not have been permanent.  It is important to stress that the 
author did not use any type of control for the increase in the number of licensed drivers and in 
the vehicles in circulation. 
Also  from  Becker  (1968),  Loureiro,  Sachsida  and  Moreira  (2004)  performed  an 
empirical test based on a sample of drivers from Brasília (DF).  According to the authors, 
some actions, such as using a mobile phone or smoking when the vehicle is in movement, are 
determinants of traffic accidents in the analysed sample. 
In 1968, a vehicle safety regulation approved by the National Highway and Traffic 
Safety  Administration  (NHTSA)  came  into  force  in  the  United  States.    This  regulation 
introduced the requirement of devices such as seat belts, tempered glass windshields, padded 
panel instruments, double break systems and energy-absorbent steering wheel columns. 
Peltzman  (1975),  taking  advantage  of  such  ‘experiment’,  tested  the  effects  of  the 
vehicle  safety  regulation  in  the  United  States,  and concluded that these changes had  not 
decreased the number of casualties on the roads.  The results of the empirical test suggest that 
the vehicle safety rules failed to reduce the number of accidents.  In a safer environment, 
drivers started to be less concerned about driving safely.  This happened because, with safer 
vehicles,  the  probability  of  death  due to careless or aggressive behaviour  is theoretically 
reduced.  More specifically, the results point to a reduction in the number of deaths among 
passengers and more accidents without victims, and on the other hand more deaths among 
pedestrians and a larger number of accidents. The net effect was that of an aggregate increase 
in the number of deaths in traffic after the enactment of the regulation.  Since then, the 
hypothesis that drivers behave more aggressively (or in a careless way) in response to an 
increase  in  the  safety  of  the  environment  to  which  they  are  exposed  became  known  as 
‘Peltzman effect’. 
Traynor (1993) tested the Peltzman hypothesis with specific data from the Integrated 
Traffic  Reporting  System  (SWITRS)  of  the  state  of  California.    This  database  contains 
information on all collision reports made by the California road police.  The reports show 
information on the location, the drivers’ behaviour, road conditions and the gravity of the 
accident.  Using this database, the author isolated specific aspects of the drivers’ conducts 
which cause accidents.  It was thus possible to conclude that, in part, the cause of careless or 
aggressive driving had occurred after the establishment of the safety regulation. 
There are papers that empirically reject the hypothesis proposed by Peltzman (1975).  
Russel and Nesbit (2007) observe that the results in the literature on this subject are not 
conclusive.  This occurs because of a problem of obtaining data related to the accidents.  
According to the authors, studies generally use the number of traffic injuries and deaths as a 
proxy  for  (un)safe  driving.    Thus,  drivers’  behaviour  would  be  measured  in  an  indirect 
fashion, generating doubts about the achieved results. 
In  that  article,  Russel  and  Nesbit  (2007)  tested  the  Pelzman  effect  for  the  safety 
changes  promoted  in  the  National  Association  for  Stock  Car  Auto  Racing  (NASCAR) 
competitions.    They  measured  the  presence  of  the  drivers’  adverse  effect  through  the 




probability of injuries, conditioned to the pilot’s involvement in an accident.  The result was a 
negative and statistically significant effect for the variable ‘probability of injuries’, which 
suggests that, in a safer environment, NASCAR drivers got involved in more accidents, since 
the cost of driving aggressively is smaller. 
Grabowski  and  Morrisey  (2002)  performed  an  econometric  analysis  with  data  on 
traffic accidents in United States public roadways, using the Analysis Reporting System, in 
the period 1985–2000.  The research results indicated that the seat belt law was efficient in 
reducing the number of casualties.  Yet, no evidence was found that the law that prohibits 
driving under the influence of alcohol had a similar effect.  Another important result suggests 
that a more rigid control in renewing the driver’s licence for people older than 60 years could 
be efficient. 
Inspired by Traynor (1993), and consequently by Peltzman (1975), this article chooses 
to consider the influence of road, weather and vehicle conditions on the behaviour of drivers 
who were involved in accidents in federal roads or in parts of those located in the state of 
Minas Gerais.  We suppose that, similarly to a regulation that compels the use of seat belts, 
variations  in  traffic  conditions  can  be  understood  as  incentive  changes,  which  ultimately 
would contribute to the attitudes chosen by the drivers. 
   
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. Database and methodology 
 
The descriptions of rescues from traffic accidents in federal roads are electronically 
made by federal road policemen in the system BR-BRASIL, from the Office of Statistics of 
the Federal Road Police Department.  The reports contain information on:  location of the 
accident,  weather  and  road  conditions,  vehicle  situation,  duration  of  the  drivers  licenses, 
presumable  cause  of  the  accident,  gravity  of  the  accident  (without  victims,  with  injured 
victims, with casualties) and other relevant factors.  The DATATRAN system receives input 
from BR-BRASIL.  This database of traffic accidents reports is only available as of January 
2004. 
Our main estimates are made with information from all the accidents that took place in 
Minas Gerais in the period from January 2004 to August 2005. 
We  adapted  the  econometric  model  proposed  by  Traynor  (1993)  to  the  variables 
available in  the  DATATRAN database.  The econometric model used is the Logit.  The 
drivers’ effort to drive safely is defined by the following equation in the Logit model: 
 
    
) , ( z UNSAFE f EFFORT =                                      (1) 
 
The variable EFFORT represents the effort or behaviour of the driver at the moment of 
the accident as evaluated by the road policeman after the accident; UNSAFE indicates the 
level of safety in the driving environment, and z is the set of other factors that can affect the 
variable EFFORT. 
The dependant variable, EFFORT, was divided in two dummies: aggressive driving 
(AGRESS)  and  inattentive  driving  (INATTENTIVE).    Aggressive  driving  occurs  when  the 
driver’s behaviour leads him to drive without keeping a safe distance from other vehicles, to 
pass when forbidden, to drive at incompatible speed or to disobey traffic signs.  In the same 
way, inattentive driving relates to lack of attention or sleepiness. 
The first independent variable of the model is the lack of road safety (UNSAFE).  This 




accident.  The characteristics are:  rain or fog, night time, lack of physical division between 
opposite lanes, road outline (curves), lack of horizontal or vertical signs, and tire conditions 
(bald or not).  Dummy variables for each one of these characteristics present value one when 
occurring or zero when not occurring.  As a result, the variable lack of safety (UNSAFE) is 
the sum of the dummy variables, which can have a value from zero to six.  It is expected that 
UNSAFE has a negative sign. 
Disaggregating z, the model used is presented like this: 
 
u INCOME YOUNG ROAD UNSAFE f EFFORT + + + + + = ) ( 3 2 1 0 β β β β α       (2) 
 
The dummy variable ROAD was used only for the complete sample.  This variable 
informs the conditions of federal roads of Minas Gerais in the location of the accident, that is, 
it serves as a control for road conditions.  It equals one when the quality of the road stretch is 
poor and zero when it is good or regular.  It is expected that it has a negative relationship with 
both AGRESS and INATTENTIVE. 
The third variable used represents the effect of the driver’s experience (YOUNG).  It 
equals one if all the drivers involved in the accident were 24 years old or younger, or zero 
otherwise.
2  According to Traynor (1993), it is expected that this variable presents a positive 
relationship  with  the  variable  AGRESS  and  a  negative  relationship  with  the  variable 
INNATENTIVE, since usually younger drivers and those with shorter licence periods do not 
have driving experience on roads and highways, and drive more aggressively. 
Traynor (1993) used a specific variable to measure the cost of driving time.  It was 
represented by the variable INCOME, which is the income per capita of the municipality 
where the accident occurred.  In this paper we use the income per capita of the municipality 
where the accident occurred only for the sample of accidents between January 2004 and 
August 2005. 
In the study by Traynor (1993) three samples were used.  The first one was a random 
group of accidents in January 1978.  The second one used only accidents with victims in the 
same one-month period.  Finally, the third sample included only accidents with casualties in 
1978.  In all of those samples, the UNSAFE coefficient was statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level, and in  every  equation the coefficient  for  this variable was negative, as 
expected.  These results, according to the authors, corroborate Peltzman’s hypothesis.  When 
facing unsafe environments, drivers are less inclined to drive aggressively and inattentively. 
It is to be stressed that it was impossible to obtain details on the behaviour of the 
drivers that did not get involved in accidents; only those who had accidents were analysed.  
Yet,  as  Traynor  (1993)  observes,  the  exclusive  use  of  observations  in  which  accidents 
occurred would not generate a bias in the results, since accidents can occur regardless of the 




The results for the sample of accidents that occurred in Minas Gerais from January 
2004 to August 2005 for both dependent variables INATTENTIVE and AGRESS are shown in 
Table I. 
All the estimated parameters in the equation were statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level.  As expected, the coefficient of the variable ROAD is negative, indicating 
                                            
2 In Traynor (1993), this variable identified the male drivers with less than 25 years.  However, our data base 
does not allow us to identify the driver that caused the accident, and therefore we used the criterion that “all of 
the  drivers  involved  in  the  accident  must  be  24  years  old  or  younger”  in  order  to  give  value  one  to  the 




that, in roads with poor conditions, drivers are more attentive.  In addition, the estimated 
coefficient for UNSAFE was negative, showing that, in augmenting the unsafe characteristics 
of driving (curves, lack of physical division between opposite lanes, rain, bald tire, bad signs), 
the probability of the accident occurring because of inattentiveness diminishes.  The results 
thus confirm Peltzman’s hypothesis. 
The estimated parameter for YOUNG was negative, also as expected.  Younger drivers 
have proven to be less inattentive.  Finally, the coefficient of the variable INCOME, that 
measures the cost of the driver’s time, was positive.  Hence, individuals with higher income 
tend to cause accidents because of inattentiveness. 
 
Table I – Logit Model Results 
Road -0.41913 * -0.71438 *
-7.23 -1.23
Unsafe -0.60956 * 0.30318 *
-3.19 1.96
Young -0.29789 * 0.20180 *
-5.78 5.06
Income 0.00004 * 0.00002 *
2.51 1.61




(*) significant at 0.10 level, (**) significant at 0.05 level and (***) significant at 0.01 level. 
z-values are presented below the estimated coefficients (robust standard-errors were used). 
Observations = 24967 
 
For the equation with the variable AGRESS, all the parameters were also statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level. The negative coefficient for ROAD shows that the 
probability of the accident happening because of aggressive driving is smaller in roads with 
bad conditions, confirming Peltzman’s hypothesis. 
The variable YOUNG presents negative coefficient in this equation. Younger drivers, 
although less inattentive, have proven to be more aggressive. The coefficient for the UNSAFE 
parameter is positive in this regression, indicating a bigger chance of the accident occurring 
because of aggressive driving in unsafe driving conditions.  This result can indicate an excess 
of confidence of the drivers in potentially dangerous situations.  The coefficient for income 
per capita, INCOME, was also positive in the equation estimated with the dependent variable 
AGRESS, that is, drivers with higher income tend to be more aggressive because, for them, 




The hypothesis that the drivers are more inattentive and aggressive when on roads 
with good conditions was confirmed. Drivers also tend to be more inattentive when weather 
and traffic conditions are favourable. As expected, the probability of getting involved in an 
accident among young drivers is higher because of aggressive driving and lower because of 
lack of attention. Yet, differently from the expected result, drivers are more aggressive in 
unsafe traffic conditions. 
In general, these results support Peltzman’s hypothesis.  Therefore, the study of human 




on accident reduction obtained through engineering projects (crash tests) are imprecise, as 
they  ignore  the  adverse  effect  that  was  considered here.   Safer roads and more resistant 
vehicles  diminish  the  expected  cost  of  accidents,  providing  an  incentive  for  more 
aggressiveness and inattentiveness among drivers.  Yet, this study does not corroborate the 
idea  that  building  better  roads  and  installing  additional  vehicle  safety  devices  produce  a 
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